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Dodge v. Ford: What Happened and
Why?
Mark J. Roe *
Behind Henry Ford’s business decisions that led to the widely taught,
famous-in-law-school Dodge v. Ford shareholder primacy decision were three
industrial organization structures that put Ford in a difficult business position.
First, Ford Motor had a highly profitable monopoly and needed much cash for
the just-begun construction of the River Rouge factory, which was said to be the
world’s largest when completed. Second, to stymie union organizers and to
motivate his new assembly-line workers, Henry Ford raised worker pay greatly;
Ford could not maintain his monopoly without sufficient worker buy-in. And,
third, if Ford explicitly justified his acts as in pursuit of the monopoly profit in
the litigation, the Ford brand would have been damaged with both his
workforce and the car buyers. The transactions underlying Dodge v. Ford and
resulting in the court order that a very large dividend be paid should be
reconceptualized as Ford Motor Company and its auto workers splitting the
“monopoly rectangle” that Ford Motor’s assembly line produced, with Ford’s
business requiring tremendous cash expenditures to keep and expand that
monopoly. Hence, a common interpretation of the litigation setting—that Ford
let slip his charitable purpose when he could have won with a business
judgment defense—should be reconsidered. Ford had a true business purpose
to cutting back the dividend—spending on labor and a vertically integrated
factory to solidify his monopoly and splitting the monopoly profit with labor—
but he would have jeopardized the strategy’s effectiveness by boldly articulating
it.
The existing main interpretations of the corporate law decision and its
realpolitik remain relevant—such as Ford seeking to squeeze out the Dodge
brothers by cutting the Ford dividend to deny the Dodge brothers cash for their
own car company. But those interpretations must take a back seat, as none fully
encompasses the industrial setting—of monopoly, incipient union organizing,
*
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and a restless workforce. Without accounting for Ford Motor’s monopoly, the
River Rouge construction, and the related labor tensions, we cannot fully
understand the Dodge v. Ford controversy. Stakeholder pressure can more
readily succeed in a firm having significant economic rents, a setting that seems
common today and was true for Ford Motor Company in the 1910s.
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INTRODUCTION
Dodge v. Ford 1 is one of the iconic cases of corporate law and is
raised to contemporary relevance by current controversy over the large
public corporation’s proper purpose. A high-profile debate now asks
whether the firm should aim to boost shareholder value as its central
goal. Or should it also bolster stakeholders and the public good, even if
it is unprofitable to do so? Major judicial decisions supporting a stark
shareholder-oriented purpose are rare, with one of the major ones,
Dodge v. Ford, being a century old.
Understanding the full business background to the transactions
that led to the dispute, the litigation, and the ruling will facilitate a
better classroom interpretation of the case and its business background.
Moreover, the underlying transactions and the underlying industrial
structure 2 also project forward to today’s rising pressure on public
corporations to be more socially relevant and more socially responsible.
Dodge v. Ford’s business foundations cannot be fully understood
without accounting for the industrial structure of the automobile
industry at the time and for how that market structure interacted with
Ford’s labor relations. Monopoly, labor relations, and corporate purpose
formed an interactive triangle. Neglecting any one of the three impedes
1.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). “One of the most famous of all
corporation-law cases is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,” says what was long the leading corporations
teaching casebook. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 134–36 (9th ed. 2005).
2.
See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Concentration, 99 WASH U. L. REV.
203 (2021) (larger and wider rents in the U.S. economy make purpose pressure more likely to
succeed than when and where rents are low and classic competition is intense).
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us from understanding what really happened. The Dodge brothers
understood well the connection between Ford’s monopoly, Ford’s
massive River Rouge expansion, and the dividend reduction that
motivated their lawsuit. They sued to stop Ford Motor’s business
expansion and got related relief from the lower court but not the
appellate court. That—an injunction against Ford’s expansion—as their
main, or equally important, goal in the litigation fits better with the
industrial setting than the generally prominent explanations (of the
Dodges seeking financing for their own startup auto company and Ford
cutting dividends to shut off one spigot of cash).
The Ford Motor Company of that era has been the subject of
three insightful genres of academic analysis. First is the analysis of
Dodge v. Ford as a shareholder primacy decision. Second is the
industrial organization fact that Ford Motor Company had monopoly
power at the time of the decision. Ford successfully built out an
assembly line for the Model T in 1913, leading to it capturing ninety
percent of the relevant automotive market and making Ford Motor
tremendously profitable. But Ford’s plans to build the huge River Rouge
complex to further solidify its monopoly position needed cash and
militated against continued large dividends to stockholders. Ford Motor
could not have sustained its 1910–1915 dividend rate while it expanded,
without dangerously pushing its cash position down to near zero. It in
fact ran out of cash in 1920. And the third analytic strain is the labor
economics of Ford Motor’s relationship with its workers during the
decade leading up to Dodge v. Ford.
I here combine insights from the underlying industrial structure
and the labor literature to better explain the core transactions that led
to the litigation. Without understanding the near simultaneity of Ford
Motor’s monopoly starting circa 1913 and Ford’s January 1914
disruption of the auto industry’s wage structure with the $5/day wage,
one cannot fully comprehend either what Ford did to provoke the 1916
litigation, Ford’s litigation strategy, or the Michigan Supreme Court’s
shareholder-focused decision. Union power sought to assert itself at
Ford Motor Company, and Henry Ford needed to accommodate labor to
maintain the company’s monopoly. If he could not induce labor to
acquiesce and adapt to the assembly line and River Rouge, he could not
keep that monopoly. The resulting labor-friendly strategy and the River
Rouge expansion both cost much cash, and redirecting the cash to
construction and labor buy-in meant that less, or none, was available
for dividends. And that—the expansion and the skipped dividends—
induced the Dodge brothers to sue to stop River Rouge and restart
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the dividends, and plausibly shaped Henry Ford’s litigation
defense strategy.
Contrary to the common thought, Ford was not simply
withholding dividends to squeeze out the Dodges—a standard
interpretation of “what really happened.” If that was his primary or sole
strategy, much of what he did makes no business sense. Ford’s famous
$5/day wage, extraordinarily high for the time, and his unprecedented
industrial expansion—when Ford Motor’s River Rouge facility was
completed, it was reported to be the largest integrated factory on the
planet—were tremendous expenditures that seemed to be much greater
than any value Ford obtained for himself by squeezing out the Dodge
brothers. Much of the astute analysis of, and in, the case portrays Ford
as withholding cash from shareholders and acting charitably to labor
and consumers, making the issue in the case whether Ford could as a
matter of corporate law properly favor labor and consumers over
shareholders. But Ford’s $5/day wage, the company’s pricing strategy
for its automobiles, and the River Rouge construction should be
reinterpreted as an uneasy labor-owner coalition that was splitting a
monopoly profit and aiming to keep that monopoly, both for Ford
Motor’s owners and for its employees.
Because the $5/day wage was such a large expense, and with the
River Rouge construction so costly, Ford Motor Company by the end of
the decade had little left for dividends. Although the analytic literature
usually sees Ford as refusing to pay dividends in order to squeeze out
the Dodges, the situation is better understood as Ford running down
the company’s cash, and, hence, being unable to pay dividends because
he was spending (most of) it.
That analysis advances our understanding of Dodge v. Ford and
its business setting: First, Ford needed labor peace to keep his
monopoly. The purportedly charitable impulse was a business effort to
keep assembly-line labor productive and not unionized. Second, rather
than Ford blurting out an underlying charitable motivation (that today
could be readily justified in court with the business judgment rule), the
setting is consistent with Ford covering up his business calculation,
which if stated explicitly could have undermined his business relations,
particularly with labor but also with the consuming public. Third, the
Michigan court oddly deferred to the Ford Motor board’s business
judgment in building out River Rouge but not to its judgment as to how
best to finance that expansion. The court ordered Ford Motor to pay a
dividend so large that, if Ford Motor continued dividends as a portion
of profit for the rest of the decade at the same rate, it would have been
left with insufficient cash to operate. The lower court orders—enjoining
further construction of River Rouge and forcing a dividend—are more
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coherent than the appellate court’s, because if expansion were halted
(as the lower court ordered), the company’s cash needs would have been
less. Fourth, the reigning realpolitik explanation for Ford Motor’s
actions—to facilitate Ford’s squeeze-out of the Dodge brothers at a price
favorable to Ford—cannot fully or even largely explain the transactions
that led to the litigation. More was going on.
This monopoly and labor configuration is key to understanding
the business background of the iconic decision. Ford’s monopoly gave
him two reasons to spend in the ways that the Dodge brothers
challenged. First, the monopoly profit gave him latitude to spend in a
way that a competitively structured industry would have precluded—I
discuss this below as increasingly part of today’s corporate governance
landscape. Second, to obtain and maintain that monopoly and keep the
assembly line running, he had to calm the workforce to achieve
sufficient labor peace. Workers had to show up and work on what many
employees could have experienced as a dehumanizing assembly line,
and Ford believed he had to thwart the unions from organizing the
company’s labor force. The labor analysis tells us what Ford believed he
had to do to protect and keep his monopoly. Dodge v. Ford, the decision
in today’s corporate law casebooks, is the consequence.
I. REINTERPRETING DODGE V. FORD’S BUSINESS SETTING
Dodge v. Ford 3 is one of corporate law’s most famous decisions.
To fully explain Ford’s famous corporate actions, the lawsuit, and Ford’s
litigation posture, we must understand his relationship with labor, his
effort to thwart union organizers, and the underlying market power of
Ford Motor Company during the 1910s. Bringing in these analytic
literatures of labor and monopoly explains the actions leading up to
the litigation better than—or as a needed supplement to—
prevailing explanations.
This effort is important not only for understanding one of the
most-taught corporate law decisions 4 but also for its contemporary
3.
4.

170 N.W. at 668.
“Dodge is in all corporate law casebooks,” states one such casebook. WILLIAM T. ALLEN,
REINIER KRAAKMAN & VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 311 (6th ed. 2021) (“the famous case”); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
ADVANCED CORPORATION LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 668–72
(2021); WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1580–88 (4th ed. 1969);
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 602–04 (2d ed. 1986) (“the classic . . . case in which a court did
order the payment of dividends”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 35, 203 n.66 (8th ed. 2013) (“The most famous case in
which a court actually ordered the payment of a dividend . . . .”); EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 134–
36 (Eisenberg took over from Cary) (“One of the most famous of all corporation-law cases is Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co.”); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, JERRY W. MARKHAM & JOHN F. COYLE, CORPORATIONS
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relevance. Today’s burgeoning purpose pressure on the corporation
more readily has an impact when brought to bear on a firm with
substantial market power—like Ford Motor Company had in the 1910s.
Competitive firms are often straitjacketed. Ford Motor was not, and
there is substantial evidence that the firms most responsive to purpose
pressure today have considerable market power. 5
The litigation. The core facts of Dodge v. Ford are well known to
corporate law academics and students. Ford had set up his famous
assembly line in 1913 and previously bought auto parts, mostly at first
from the Dodge brothers, who as part of their deal with Ford in 1903
acquired ten percent of the Ford company’s stock. But by 1913, the
Dodge brothers were no longer supplying the bulk of Ford Motor
Company’s parts, with the Dodges and Ford pursuing new, different
business strategies: Ford was seeking to vertically integrate by building
rather than buying most of the car’s parts. He aimed to build out a good
quality, mass-market, inexpensive car that would be accessible to most
middle-class Americans, while the Dodge brothers were themselves
building and selling upscale cars.
Ford cut back on dividends. When the Dodges sued, seeking
dividends and an order that the Ford Motor Company halt its
expansion, the Michigan Supreme Court said:
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford
conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties . . . he and
his codirectors owe to . . . minority stockholders. A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of

AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (4th ed. 2016); WILLIAM A. KLEIN,
J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS 220–25 (10th ed. 2018); CHARLES R.T.
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 274–77 (8th ed. 2017).

5.
See Roe, supra note 2, at 244–49. A wide consensus of financial findings associates firms
that do well (as shown by their higher-than-normal profits) with more ESG (environmental,
stakeholder, and governance) value and CSR (corporate social responsibility). The direction of
causation is disputed. See Olga Hawn & Hyoung-Goo Kang, The Effect of Market and Nonmarket
Competition on Firm and Industry Corporate Social Responsibility, in 38 SUSTAINABILITY,
STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 313, 327, 330 (Sinziana
Dorobantu, Ruth Aguilera, Jiao Luo & Frances Milliken eds., 2018) (finding more CSR in
monopolies and less in highly competitive industries); Gunnar Friede, Timo Bush & Alexander
Bassen, ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical
Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210 (2015) (literature review concluding that nine of the ten
relevant studies find that companies with strong financial results do more CSR, but not resolving
the causal direction). I assess this and related evidence in Roe, supra note 2. The evidence is not
uniform. Some find more competitive industries do more CSR. E.g., Shuli Du, C.B. Bhattacharya
& Sankar Sen, Corporate Social Responsibility and Competitive Advantage: Overcoming the Trust
Barrier, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1528 (2011).
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means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction
of profits or to . . . devot[ing] them to other purposes. 6

Rather than argue that high wages and River Rouge were, in his
business judgment, means to pursue profitability and maintain the
company’s monopoly rents, Ford said he wanted to do good for all. 7
Several prominent theories explain the underlying transaction
and Ford’s testimony that he was serving the public by expanding his
operations. One theory is that the company cut cash dividends to starve
the Dodge brothers of the money they needed to compete with Ford
Motor or just to set up Ford profitably squeezing out the Dodge
brothers—by buying them out at a low price. 8 A second explanation is
the reverse, that the Dodge brothers wanted the dividend to deny Ford
Motor the cash to build out the River Rouge factory. 9 A third
6.
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 684. The opinion overall, however, did not endorse primacy
as strongly as this passage suggested. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1157 n.31 (1932) (“Neither the language of the opinion
nor the relief granted necessarily involves an unqualified acceptance of the maximum-profit-forstockholders formula.”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 772–75 (2005) (“[T]he opinion never stated that directors’ exclusive duty is to
maximize shareholder profits.”). But for most analysts, it is the, or one of the, key shareholder
primacy rulings (despite some contrary tendencies in the opinion), and for critics, it is a case that
needs to be explained away (as superseded, ambiguous, or not really pro-shareholder after all). See
Elhauge, supra, at 772–73; cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Making Sense of the Business Roundtable’s
Reversal on Corporate Purpose, 46 J. CORP. L. 285, 294–98 (2021).
The textually quoted passage is regularly invoked to understand the case. See CLARK, supra
note 4, at 603 (“In a famous, oft-quoted passage . . . .”). For later Delaware judicial endorsement of
the principle, see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“Promoting, protecting, or pursuing nonstockholder considerations must lead at some point to
value for stockholders.”).
7.
Ford said the objective was to do “as much good as we can, everywhere, for everybody
concerned . . . [a]nd incidentally to make money.” M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford
Motor Company: Everything Old is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 38 (J. Mark
Ramseyer ed., 2009) (setting out an insightful analysis of the business background and strategic
setting).
8.
The Dodge brothers so stated: by “increasing . . . capital investments [and] by
withholding the dividends from stockholders to which they are entitled, the necessary result will
be the destruction of competition.” Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 673 (emphasis added). Ford Motor’s
dividends were integral, it is thought, to the Dodge brothers’ financing. Alan M. Weinberger, Henry
Ford’s Wingman: A Perspective on the Centennial of Dodge v. Ford, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1013,
1028 (2018). While surely the Dodges would welcome more cash, their actual financial strength
belied their litigation posture. From 1915 to 1919 (when they finally received the bulk of the
ordered dividend), their physical volume increased by a factor of eight and their sales volume by a
factor of ten. CHARLES K. HYDE, THE DODGE BROTHERS: THE MEN, THE MOTOR CARS, AND THE
LEGACY 113 (2005).
9.
The first explanation is plausible but its centrality for Ford somewhat muted, since the
Dodge brothers were going for a more upscale market and Ford for a mass market. Henderson,
supra note 7, at 56 (by 1916, the Dodges’ auto company was successful and could raise funding
externally); Weinberger, supra note 8, at 1027 (the Dodge “brothers resigned as directors [of Ford
Motor] to manufacture their own car, large and more expensive than the Model T” and called their
car, according to VINCENT CURCIO, HENRY FORD 93 (2013), in contrast to the Model T, “a real
automobile”). In 1914, Ford’s Model T sold for not much more than half of the Dodges’ prime auto
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explanation is business branding: Ford’s public-oriented stance won the
“hearts of ordinary American citizens.” 10 In this view, the litigation
posture was an instance of Henry Ford’s intuitive and effective
marketing. A fourth explanation is tax: the new income tax taxed
dividends unfavorably compared to how it taxed other income. 11
The prior paragraph sketches the Dodge v. Ford realpolitik as it
now stands. Each explanation is plausible. Most are not mutually
exclusive and, in my view, most must be part of the full story. But they
are not more powerful than the explanation I develop next, and the
existing accounts cannot, in my view, alone or in combination, fully
explain the underlying transactions and Ford’s litigation strategy.
II. THE $5/DAY WAGE, THE MODEL T MONOPOLY, AND THE RIVER
ROUGE EXPANSION
To understand Dodge v. Ford, one must first understand Ford
Motor’s monopoly and the labor and wage policy Ford pursued to keep
it. The company had a monopoly, and it had a dire labor problem. If the
company did not solve its labor problem, it is unclear whether its
monopoly could continue.
On the basic monopoly: the company’s 1912 profits were an
astounding 132 percent of tangible assets. 12 Ford Motor “had emerged
as a near monopoly in the production of . . . relatively inexpensive
cars . . . .” 13 It had a ninety-six percent market share of the popular car
market and half of the total unit production of cars in the United States;
the Model T had no direct competition. 14
and the Dodges emphasized their car’s steel construction and more powerful engine. See Dodge
Celebrates
Century
of
Automobiles,
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Dec.
18,
2014),
https://www.dispatch.com/article/20141218/news/312189756.
Still, once both companies were in the car business, either could have shifted its target
market into the other’s. For some car buyers, price traded off against quality such that the buyer
could have bought either car. And a basic squeeze-out explanation could still have been in play.
That is, Ford had the incentive to pay the Dodges as little as possible even if the Dodges were not
otherwise in the car business. See below for the limits of even the basic squeeze-out explanation.
10. “This enhanced the Ford legend and . . . expanded the market for ‘Ford’ cars.” Henderson,
supra note 7, at 69 (quoting STEVEN WATTS, THE PEOPLE’S TYCOON 258 (2006)).
11. Weinberger, supra note 8, at 1036.
12. Daniel M. G. Raff & Lawrence H. Summers, Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages? 5 J.
LAB. ECON. S57, S64 (1987). Interest rates today have investors needing only a two or three percent
return. With riskier assets like those in the auto industry back then, the expected return was more
than two or three percent, but 132 percent was still exceptionally high—more than doubling the
money invested in a single year. And 1912 results were before the assembly line further boosted
profit.
13. Id.
14. Id. at S64. The Michigan court opined that Ford Motor’s action did not make it an
actionable monopoly under the antitrust laws. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich.
1919). To the extent Ford Motor had, or with the expansion would be, a monopoly, it was one that
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At the same time, Ford Motor Company faced powerful labor
pressure—many workers would not show up every day at regular hours,
with the no-shows thereby disrupting the assembly line—and, perhaps
the gravest threat to Ford Motor and its assembly line, the company
faced incipient efforts of a radical union to organize and unionize the
autoworkers. To deal with these two pressures, Ford Motor boosted the
wage rate for its assembly-line workers to $5/day wage—a tremendous
salary then for a worker. 15 More than ten thousand applicants lined up
to apply day after day for the $5 wage. 16
These business aspects of Ford Motor and Ford’s dispute with
the Dodges seem unconnected to one another, but they are not. In the
next paragraphs, I braid together (1) Ford’s stated motivation in Dodge
v. Ford to do good for his workers and the public and (2) the $5/day wage
with (3) Ford Motor’s profitability and monopoly power—all of which
arose around the same time. Ford Motor cut back its dividend in 1916,
and the Dodge brothers sued soon thereafter; the big wage was first
announced in January 1914. And “[i]n 1913, [the year just prior,] Ford
began . . . construction of the world’s largest factory . . . near the Rouge
River . . . .” 17 A company with a factory of such scope would need good
labor relations. When the River Rouge factory was completed, “[t]he
68,000-strong River Rouge workforce was the largest at any industrial
facility in the United States (and quite possibly the world).” 18
Multiple explanations for the $5/day wage have been offered.
Proponents of economic efficiency say it could have made workers more
productive because they would fear losing their jobs, which at $5/day
were largely irreplaceable. 19 Or the high wage made them more
productive because workers with a generous wage gave back that value
to the company by being more energized and motivated on the assembly

“accrue[d] to a concern which makes what the public demands.” Id. The more modern phraseology
would be that its market power arose from Ford Motor’s “skill, foresight, and industry.”
15. LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
387–88 (1928).
16. Daniel M. G. Raff, Wage Determination Theory and the Five-Dollar Day at Ford, 48 J.
ECON. HIST. 387, 389 (1988); Henry Ford Explains Why He Gives Away $10,000,000, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Jan. 11, 1914, at 1, 3. The $5/day went to workers who displayed lifestyle characteristics
that Ford preferred. MAX KOCH, CAPITALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE 54 (2012).
17. Andrew E. Kersten, Book Note, 30 MICH. HIST. REV. 213 (2004) (reviewing FORD R.
BRYAN, ROUGE: PICTURED IN ITS PRIME, COVERING THE YEARS 1917-1940 (2003)). Bryan describes
an ongoing process of Henry Ford and the company’s senior managers from 1913 to 1916 of
investigation, planning, and land acquisition, culminating in a November 1916 board resolution
on the River Rouge facility—just about when the Dodge brothers sued. BRYAN, supra, at 16–20.
18. Joshua B. Freeman, Giant Factories, 72 LABOUR / LE TRAVAIL 177, 188–89 (2013) (Can.).
19. Id.; Jason E. Taylor, Did Henry Ford Mean to Pay Efficiency Wages?, 24 J. LAB. RSCH.
683, 685 (2003).
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line. 20 Given the history of high job turnover at Ford, a productivity
theory is plausible, 21 although respected accounts conclude that Ford
Motor had substantially resolved its turnover and absenteeism problem
before it launched the $5/day. 22
A darker explanation could be in play. It is that Ford paid the
$5/day wages to buy the company’s workers away from the Wobblies,
the radical labor union seeking to organize Ford’s assembly line
workers, 23 which had organized “spectacular strikes” elsewhere in the
Midwest in 1913, including strikes, sometimes violent, at Ford
suppliers like the Firestone tire company, 24 and which espoused for
workers a “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency” and “striking on the
job.” 25 Henry Ford was anti-union and Ford Motor later had a
reputation for meeting unionization efforts with company-initiated
violence. 26 The $5/day arose after decades of labor strife in the United
States, and an associate of Ford at the company stated that “Mr. Ford
said he would lick the I. W. W. by paying the men $5 a day.” 27
The Wobblies ultimately failed to organize the Ford workers in
the 1910s, but Henry Ford could not have known when the effort started
that unionization would not succeed. Whether the $5/day wage rate was
the reason they failed is hard to determine. 28 “Ford’s wage-setting
20. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543
(1982) (theorizing how above-market wages act as a gift in exchange for workers doing more than
the minimum work); Janet L. Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
200 (1984) (describing models of wages and productivity during periods of unemployment).
21. Raff & Summers, supra note 12, at S65, S67; M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani,
Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 588 (2009).
22. ALLAN NEVINS, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY 37, 50 (1954). Even if resolved,
Ford could have wanted to make sure the resolution did not unravel.
23. Raff, supra note 16, at 397 (“Ford paid the five-dollar day, [an executive aide] reported
being told by Henry, to beat the Wobblies.”); N.Y. TIMES, supra note 16 (the unions, Ford said,
“have never succeeded in organizing our factory. We pay better than anybody else”). But see Taylor,
supra note 19, at 690–91 (the Wobblies were already in decline when Ford announced the $5 per
day wage).
24. STEPHEN MEYER, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN
THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY 1908-1921, at 93 (1981).
25. Id. at 92.
26. COLLEEN BURCAR, IT HAPPENED IN MICHIGAN: REMARKABLE EVENTS THAT SHAPED
HISTORY 91–92 (2010). The “battle of the overpass” is well known to labor historians and
organizers. Ford Motor’s security people attacked union organizers, including famed Walter
Reuther, on the footbridge to the River Rouge plant. Id.
27. Nevins, supra note 22, at 537. The American Federation of Labor then sought to organize
Ford in 1914 and attributed their failure to the $5/day, which was announced in January 1914.
See MEYER, supra note 24, at 93.
The Wobblies’ official name was the Industrial Workers of the World.
28. Raff, supra note 16, at 396–98. That is, the $5/day could have told Ford workers that the
company would come through for them and they had no need of a union for a good wage. And it’s
possible that the symbolism of a successful manufacturer paying well made more industrial
workers in the Midwest amenable to the idea that raw capitalism would come through for them.
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policies probably involved a substantial component of rent sharing” of
Ford Motor’s monopoly profits, two economists tell us. 29 A Wobblies-led
strike at Studebaker’s auto company in 1913 ended after a week. It
brought shorter working hours, and was associated with unionization
fears among the Detroit industrialists 30—was it the beginning of union
success, as it could have seemed, or the end of it?
Keep in mind here that there are two ways to interpret Ford’s
charitable expressions. If the rent sharing was optional on Ford’s part,
a charitable Henry Ford was being generous, in line with his Dodge v.
Ford testimony; but if the rent sharing was necessary for Ford to keep
the monopoly—because, say, cars could not be produced if labor was
restless and $5/day was needed to keep the workers working well and
to buy them away from the union—then the monopoly and the
concomitant monopoly profit were jointly produced by labor and Ford,
each with significant bargaining power over how to divide it.
The next step in laying down our foundation for fully
understanding Dodge v. Ford is to connect Ford’s labor problem to the
shareholder primacy lawsuit, and to view the two groups, stakeholders
and shareholders, as grappling with one another to capture a share of
Ford’s monopoly profits. 31 Ford could have taken a property perspective
in the corporate lawsuit—an early but now weakened justification for
shareholder primacy: “It’s my company and I’ll do with it what I want,”
he could have argued, potentially convincingly in the 1910s. He could
have invoked the business judgment rule—strong today, maybe less
powerful back then—to justify withholding dividends to build the
unprecedented River Rouge factory, which he expected to be profitable.
He instead took a broad corporate purpose perspective, saying that he
sought both to keep Ford Motor’s workers employed and well paid, while
providing the broad citizenry with access to a good, basic, massproduced, and affordably priced car. 32

In the technical vocabulary, the failure first of radical unionization at Ford Motor, and perhaps
more widely, could have partly been endogenous to Ford’s $5/day.
29. Raff & Summers, supra note 12, at S60. The “rent” in econ-speak is from Ford’s high
profits. It is the excess profit beyond what the company needed to stay in business. An economic
“rent” can come from market power, from greater efficiency, or from an inexpensive resource that
others lack.
30. Nevins, supra note 22, at 379, 522 (“The I.W.W. for a time alarmed Detroit employers”).
31. Some of that wrestling could well have occurred in Henry Ford’s mind as he considered
how to weaken unionization and assure that workers kept up the pace as cogs on his assembly
line.
32. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 16 (“We are trying to do something that we consider for the good
of a lot of people . . . . [B]etween 20,000 and 30,000 [workers] should be contented and well
fed . . . . We shall continue to make our cars better and cheaper . . . .”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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This monopoly-with-a-purpose perspective helps to explain two
key elements of the Dodge v. Ford transactional foundation. First, it
explains why Henry Ford spoke not of pro-stockholder business
judgment but of benefiting stakeholders. He said he was sharing profit
with his $5/day employees—dividing up Ford Motor’s monopoly profits
with his workforce. 33 Second, the stakeholder focus justified Ford
Motor’s decision to slash dividends and instead pay to keep employment
up 34 and produce attractively priced cars for the American masses. For
a business owner with a profitable monopoly facing powerful union
organization pressures (and facing the new Washington-based antitrust
machinery), justifying himself with a broad corporate purpose was
better than talking about corporate profits, shareholder dividends, and
business judgment. Ford was allocating to his employees and away from
his shareholders a slice of his monopoly rectangle (to refer to the shape
from the economist’s diagram of what a monopolist takes from
consumers in a monopolized market 35). And perhaps equally
realistically, Ford could not have built and kept that monopoly unless
he had sufficient labor peace, with the $5/day wage being his main way
to achieve it.
And besides, a public-regarding litigation stance could have
been needed to put him in good stead with newly active antitrust forces.
The Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the
Supreme Court had recently entered the antitrust picture, with the
Court having ordered the breakup of Standard Oil earlier in that
decade 36 and with the Clayton Act and the founding of the FTC having
just passed into law. In New Jersey, Woodrow Wilson had pushed
corporate reforms through the legislature that were aimed to impede
corporate monopoly. The Dodge brothers’ complaint asserted that a
“necessary result [of the capital investment] will be the destruction of
competition on the sale of [low-priced cars and] . . . a complete monopoly
in the manufacture and sale of such cars.” 37 The trial court then

33. Raff, supra note 16, at 387.
34. Cf. Taylor, supra note 19, at 684 (Ford subscribed to the “high wage doctrine”—that high
wages “increase[d] aggregate demand, production, and employment”); HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND
WORK 126–30 (1922) (“It was . . . an act of social justice . . . . [P]aying good wages is the most
profitable way of doing business.”).
35. For those unfamiliar with the term, at its core, it is just the monopoly profit. The
“rectangle” indication comes from the economist’s supply and demand graphic. The monopolist
raises its price above its costs, and, graphically, this forms a rectangle (of excess profit on the yaxis times the quantity sold on the x-axis).
36. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
37. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 673 (Mich. 1919) (“in violation of the State,
Federal and common law”); Henderson, supra note 7, at 60.
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enjoined further construction of the River Rouge facility 38 (but was
reversed on appeal). Half of the original complaint and half of the lower
court’s relief depended on the monopoly channel.
Today, Ford could have readily justified his action as his
business judgment as to how best to pursue corporate profit—and
plausibly could have done so then. Multiple explanations could have
buttressed
that
business
judgment:
employee
motivation;
compromising with a shadow unionization effort; or buying a beneficial
public image—branding. But articulating a broad purpose—as Ford
did—rather than a calculated business judgment would have been more
effective back then if Ford’s overarching goals were to keep employees
loyal, motivated, and not unionized, and to impress buyers of the Model
T with a vision of Ford Motor as a servant of the car-buying public and
the company’s employees, and not as a grim profit machine. That is, for
Henry Ford to articulate what might well have been a main but cynical
aspect of his business purpose—“I sought to beat back the Wobblies so
that I could keep the assembly line, my great and hugely profitable
monopolistic innovation, running”—would have been a poor way to
maintain labor peace and keep the car-buying public grateful, and not
have been well designed to keep the antitrust authorities away. 39
Henry Ford’s trial testimony presages modern rhetoric about
corporate purpose and the reality that firms in uncompetitive markets
are better able to facilitate broad purpose. After all, Ford was reaping
monopoly profits, but continued monopoly profit for Ford Motor was not
assured, and his best strategic choice was to share some of these
monopoly profits with his employees. The situation in a sense evinces a
coalition—a team—because Ford, under labor pressure, likely had to

38. “The owning, holding or operating by . . . Ford Motor Company . . . and the using or
appropriating [of] any funds . . . of said defendant . . . for a smelting plant or blast furnace . . . now
in course of construction on or near the River Rouge . . . is without authority of law and is
permanently and absolutely restrained and enjoined.” Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 487.
39. Thus, astute analysis of how Dodge v. Ford would play out today shows that a modern
CEO would be counseled on the business judgment rule and the CEO would emphasize the proprofit basis for the decisions—possibly even to the point of dissembling, although it should be easy
for a CEO to believe that pro-social branding and motivated employees make for a better company.
Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 177, 180 (2008) (“CEOs who testify in depositions and trials [on such issues today] are
better coached and more willing to dissemble than Henry Ford was.”).
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split his monopoly profits with his workers. 40 While team production 41
can be, and is, seen as a principled way to foster a more effective
organization, there is no good reason why the concept could not also be
adapted to a labor-owner coalition to facilitate a monopoly’s success.
The Ford team was not an independent board allocating profit (which
is the approximate team production conceptualization 42), but an
entrepreneur understanding that if labor was not with him, the
assembly line would stop dead. 43
III. THE SQUEEZE-OUT
But can the underlying Dodge v. Ford transaction be explained
otherwise? In part, yes. In full, no. The usual realpolitik explanation is
that Henry Ford tried to squeeze out the Dodge brothers by withholding
dividends—and the dividend reduction is seen as the gravamen of the
lawsuit. The Dodge brothers, denied cash from the car company, would
then sell their stock back to Ford at a below-true-value price. 44

40. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999). Blair and Stout’s team production theory is more attractive normatively than
the coalition-for-monopoly outlined in the text. In Blair and Stout’s original team production
conceptualization, more value is being created for society by the team. In the interpretation here
of Dodge v. Ford, the value is being created for the team, partly at the expense of the outsiders.
The positive connotation could be recaptured if we thought that the assembly line itself needed
team-type compromises and governance to succeed.
41. Id. at 265–319.
42. Id.
43. While the team was splitting profits, it was not splitting governance. As Henry
Hansmann showed, organizations can easily suffer dysfunction when the governing entity is riven
by sharply different interests. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 288–91 (1996).
In Ford Motor, labor shared the profits (in Henry Ford’s formulation of what he was doing) but not
formal governance rights. Roughly contemporaneous German post–World War I turmoil led to
precursor institutions to modern codetermination, with formal labor representation in the
corporate boardroom—a sharing of governance rights.
44. Marc Hodak, The Ford Squeeze-Out, N.Y.U. LEONARD N. STERN SCH. OF BUS. (2007),
www.ssrn.com/abstract=1011924 [https://perma.cc/E8YR-T7NY]; Henderson, supra note 7
(discussing without endorsing the squeeze-out interpretation); CLARK, supra note 4, at 604:
Ford may simply have wanted, by turning off the faucet of financial return, to weaken
the position of the Dodge brothers so that he could later get them to sell their stock to
him more cheaply. . . . [T]he decision to suspend dividends could have been one step in
a . . . squeezeout plan.
See also Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving
Cases, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 835–37; James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 499 (2015); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP.
L. 277, 315 (1998) (“[The] refusal by Henry Ford to pay dividends . . . is the quintessential squeezeout technique . . . . Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is best viewed as a minority oppression case.”);
Weinberger, supra note 8, at 1014 n.6. Ford Motor was not a public company then. Hence, the
Dodge brothers could not simply sell their shares on a stock exchange to investors who could wait
for dividends later.
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Squeezing out the Dodges surely pleased Ford. But a full
transactional perspective must explain three elements: (1) why Ford
Motor Company was so low on cash by the end of the decade, (2) why
Ford pushed the public purpose explanation for his actions instead of a
business judgment rationale, and (3) the particulars of the ultimate,
post-litigation transaction in which Ford bought out the Dodges.
Ford Motor’s dwindling cash. The squeeze-out explanation
cannot explain all three foundational elements of the Dodge v. Ford
dispute. On (1), Ford did not stop paying dividends because he was
squirreling away the cash in, say, Cayman Islands accounts. The
company was low on cash because of the two linked business decisions:
first to pay the $5/day wage and, second, to build the River Rouge
factory—reported to be the world’s largest when completed. 45 These
were huge expenses, and the squeeze-out explanation cannot account
for Ford’s decision to incur them.
Here’s what I mean: the $5/day wage was costing Ford about $10
million per year. 46 If one thinks of this as Ford Motor committing to pay
an above-market wage rate, then that commitment could be
conceptualized as a large investment by Ford into its labor force, to be
paid for (and its value realized) over the years to come. The present
value of this added expense stream of $10 million annually, capitalized
at five percent or ten percent, made it at its inception a commitment by
Ford to invest up to $100 or $200 million in autoworkers’ human capital
(or in their loyalty to Ford Motor or in their willingness to come to work
day after day to monotonously turn the bolts at their stations on the
assembly line). And the River Rouge facility cost hundreds of millions

The Dodge brothers asserted that Ford Motor’s expansion and $5/day were setting up the
conditions to disturb the value of the Dodges’ stock in Ford Motor: “The whole scheme is to bring
about such a relation of wages, revenue and cash requirement of the business as to preclude
dividends of a reasonable return upon the fair value of the capital stock.” Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668, 679 (1919).
45. GREG GRANDIN, FORDLANDIA 43 (2009) (the facility had “sixteen million square feet of
floor space, ninety-three buildings, close to a hundred thousand workers, a dredged deepwater
port, and the world’s largest steel foundry”). Ford Motor had cash in 1916 when the suit was filed;
but with the River Rouge spending plans, it would use that cash. Id. And transactionally, Ford
Motor could have borrowed or raised new equity to obtain the cash; Ford’s aversion to outside
financing and financial influence could have played a role here.
46. MEYER, supra note 24, at 109 (estimating that the $5/day cost Ford Motor about $10
million annually).
Ford Motor employed fifteen thousand workers when it doubled wages from $2.50 per day to
$5.00 per day, and it planned to hire four thousand new workers. Id. At three hundred workdays
annually (from a fifty-week year of six-day workweeks), that wage rate raise amounted to 19,000
x 300 x $2.50, or $14,250,000 annually.
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of dollars as well. 47 If Ford Motor continued to pay dividends at its 1915
rate, it would have run out of cash. Figure 1 illustrates.
FIGURE 1: FORD MOTOR’S DIMINISHED CASH IF IT MAINTAINED ITS 1915
DIVIDEND RATE
0.40
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The above Figure shows in the solid line Ford Motor’s evolving cash position as it grew,
began to build out the River Rouge facility, and raised its wage rate. Its actual cash
position as a percentage of revenues declined from its 1915 high. And had it continued
its 1915 dividend rate as a percentage of profits, it would have declined more
precipitously to a near-zero cash balance by 1917, as the dashed line shows. The Dodges
asked that “at least 75 per cent. of the . . . cash surplus [be dividended] and for the
future that [Ford Motor] be required to distribute all of the earnings of the company
except as may be reasonably required for emergency purposes.” Dodge v. Ford, at 474.
The appellate court ordered Ford Motor to pay out half of its $50+ million cash position
in 1916. Had Ford Motor continued paying dividends at that rate, Ford Motor’s cash
level would have declined almost as severely as the dashed line. True, the lower court
presumably would have stopped ordering dividends when the cash position declined, so
the bottoming out of the cash in 1917–1918 exaggerates the impact. The year-to-year
data (and underlying sources) are specified in Table 1.

47. See SELTZER, supra note 15, at 114 (from 1918–1920, Ford invested $66,453,345;
$79,188,320; and $127,210,862). Surprisingly, the literature does not reveal a precise cost, with
the Michigan and Ford archives saying that none has been successfully calculated. (Ford Motor
was a private company then.) In 1916, just before the River Rouge massive construction began,
Ford had plant, machinery, and equipment of $65 million and cash of $52 million. By 1927, Ford
had plant, machinery, equipment, and other tangible assets exceeding $300 million. ANNUAL
REPORTS OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY (1916, 1927).
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But the ultimate buyout of the Dodge brothers cost Ford $25
million (with the total payout to all minority stockholders being $106
million). 48 Yet the Dodges early on offered to sell their stock to Ford for
$35 million: that should be seen as an opening offer that was only $10
million more than the ultimate purchase price. While it is hard to
ascertain how much benefit Ford obtained for himself in buying out the
Dodge brothers by his deploying (nearly) all his cash into assembly-line
human capital and the physical capital of the River Rouge plant, it is
also hard to imagine that the squeeze-out benefit to Ford of the Dodge
v. Ford decision was close to the hundreds of millions of dollars Ford
Motor was spending on labor and expansion. Henry Ford had many
negative characteristics. Wasting money was not one of them. For Ford
to spend so much in an unheard-of capital expansion and human capital
investment in order to save $10 million in a better squeeze-out price
from Dodges (and maybe five times as much from buying out the other
minority stockholders) would seem to have been unwise.
It is at least plausible and, when we just consider the numbers,
even likely that Ford had a business plan that involved high pay to
employees and steep vertical integration. The skipped dividend was a
consequence of the business strategy, with the buyout not itself the
primary strategic aim. That is, the strategy was not centrally aimed at
squeezing out the Dodges by withholding dividends but to spend the
cash on labor and the River Rouge facility. That strategy then
constricted Ford’s cash and his capacity to pay generous dividends. 49 I
calculate in Table 1 Ford Motor’s cash position if it had kept up its 1915
dividend rate as a portion of profits for 1916–1919. The company’s cash
position would have been dangerously depleted—nearly zero in 1917
and not much more subsequently.
Ford Motor could not have sustained both its prior dividend rate
and its business plan. While the Michigan Supreme Court said it was
not interfering with Ford Motor’s baseline business strategy (of
expanding production, vertically integrating, and lowering car prices),
that strategy, the Ford board could have concluded, was best

48. CURCIO, supra note 9, at 106, 120.
49. A modern finance perspective—from the Modigliani-Miller hypotheses—would note that
if transaction costs were low enough, skipping the dividend was only one way to finance River
Rouge and the $5/day. Borrowing the money—which Henry Ford, scornful of bankers, only did
reluctantly—was one possibility. Another Modigliani-Miller transactional channel could have been
for Ford Motor to sell new equity—which Henry Ford, entangled with minority shareholders,
presumably would not favor. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
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implemented by keeping Ford Motor’s cash-to-revenue ratio steady. 50
In effect, the court did not question Ford’s business judgment on
operations but, when ordering the dividend, it did question and reverse
the Ford board’s judgment as to the right financial strategy needed to
support the board’s operational decision.
One might think Ford Motor could still have paid out a smaller
dividend—and indeed the Michigan Supreme Court so ordered, with the
dividend scaled to be half of the company’s cash-on-hand. However,
Ford Motor’s cash as a percentage of revenue was not rising across the
relevant years—because it was sinking the cash into the River Rouge
facility and its $5/day employees. Ford Motor’s business judgment—to
switch to a no- or low-dividend strategy—could well have been tied to
its operational judgment, in that it needed to stop dividends to prevent
a further erosion of cash-to-revenue unless substitute financing was
readily available. (It’s common even today, with stronger financial
markets than Ford faced, for companies to favor financing new
investment by retaining earnings by keeping dividends low over
financing it by borrowing or selling new equity. 51) Nevertheless, the
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order of a dividend,
which amounted to nearly half of Ford Motor’s 1916 profit. Again, the
effect was that the Michigan court would not disrupt Ford Motor’s
operational judgment but did overturn the company’s business
judgment as to how much cash the company needed. 52

50. “Defendants say, and it is true, that a considerable cash balance must be at all times
carried by such a concern.” Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919). And Ford
asserted “that personally he has always been in favor of maintaining very large cash balances;
that he has always been opposed to borrowing money and that he has urged the policy of paying
cash for . . . expenses.” Id. at 676 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ford further testified
that the expenditures of the Ford Motor Company from day to day are very great and
its requirements of cash are enormous. He shows that if . . . there should be a sudden
falling off of business . . . that it would require great sums of money to carry on the
business of the company, and his idea is to be well fortified against emergencies.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
And, related to the bilateral quality of the monopoly:
This defendant is opposed to any policy which would necessitate the discharge of large
numbers of employees in case there should be a sudden depression of business . . . and
this defendant believes that the latter methods and policies [on cash balances]
ultimately redound to the best financial interests of the company and its stockholders.
Id. at 676–77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
52. Henry Ford was not silent on this issue, as we’ve seen: “Defendants say, and it is true,
that a considerable cash balance must be at all times carried by such a concern.” Dodge v. Ford,
170 N.W. at 685.
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TABLE 1: ANALYSIS OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S DIVIDEND PAYOUTS 53
1913

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

1919

Revenue ($ MM)

89.10

119.50

121.20

206.90

274.60

308.70

305.60

Cash-on-hand

13.23

27.09

41.57

52.55

45.13

66.55

59.83

Cash/Revenue

0.15

0.23

0.34

0.25

0.16

0.22

0.20

Profit ($ MM)

25.00

30.30

24.60

60.00

26.70

30.30

24.90

0.53

0.89

1.69

0.88

1.69

2.20

2.40

11.20

12.20

16.20

3.20

9.20

5.20

24.20

0.45

0.40

0.66

0.05

0.34

0.17

0.97

39.60

17.62

2.00

16.43

16.15

.31

6.93

7.98

.08

.00

.02

.03

Cash/Profit
Dividends ($ MM)
Profit portion
distributed

If 1915 dividend of 66% of profit were
maintained in 1917, 1918, and 1919, dividend
payouts would have been ($ MM):

If 1915 dividend rate of 66% of profit were
maintained, then all else unchanged, cash-onhand would have been ($ MM):

If 66% payout persisted, cash/revenue would
have been:

This Table displays on the second line Ford Motor Company’s cash during the critical
period. The Dodge brothers sued in 1916, when the prior year’s dividend payout was
sixty-six percent of profits. Had Ford Motor kept up that dividend rate as a portion of
profit through 1919, the year of the appellate decision, the company’s cash would have
been nearly depleted by 1917, not the healthy actual $45 million.

53. Sources: for cash-on-hand, the sources were Ford Motor Company’s annual reports for the
relevant years (which are quite abbreviated, often only a single page), available from the Ford
library and D’Arcy Becker, Marcy Orwig & Aimee Pernsteiner, Symbolic Versus Substantive
Regulatory Requirements: The Case of Ford Motor Company in the Early 1900s, 42 Acc’t
Historians J. 35, 46 (2015); for revenues, profit, and dividends paid, Henderson, supra note 7; for
the remainder, calculated. The 1919 payout was less than the original amount ordered—half of
Ford Motor’s 1916 cash—because the Michigan Supreme Court allowed that amount to be reduced
by the small dividends paid during the interim from the lawsuit’s 1916 filing.
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The second to last row shows how Ford Motor’s cash would have deteriorated had it
kept up its 1915 dividend rate as a portion of profit. In 1915 Ford Motor paid sixty-six
percent of its profits out in dividends (from $16.20/$24.60), and if it continued that rate
in 1916, it would have paid a dividend of $39.6 million (from .66*$60 million), instead
of the $3.2 million dividend that it paid. That larger dividend would have left Ford
Motor with cash of only $16.15 million, less than half of its balance in 1915, although
the company had nearly doubled its sales from 1915 to 1916. Had Ford Motor continued
to pay sixty-six percent of profits as dividends in 1917, 1918, and 1919, then (unless it
obtained other financing) its cash position would have approached zero in 1917 and
been much less than it had been in the early 1910s, when it was a much smaller
company. It had to change its 1915 financial strategy—it needed cash from new equity,
from new borrowing, or from retained earnings—if it was going to expand.
This need to change its 1915 dividend strategy can be seen in the last row, which shows
the cash/revenue ratio if the sixty-six percent of profit dividend rate persisted. That
ratio would have been eight percent in 1916, near zero in 1917, and two or three percent
in the two years thereafter. In 1915 that ratio was thirty-four percent, and in 1916 it
was twenty-five percent. (The order was that Ford Motor pay half of its cash in 1916 as
a dividend; if that policy—half of cash paid as dividend—persisted, then Ford Motor’s
cash/revenue would have been almost as low in 1919 as the amounts calculated above.
Of course, if the dividend size were revisited annually from 1917 to 1919, Ford Motor
would presumably have been able to show the court a need to retain more of the profits,
given its expenses and growth. The table exaggerates to show a maximum impact.)
That is, Ford Motor was expanding faster than its cash position, even after it cut back
its dividend. And the dividend ordered by the trial court would, if implemented in real
time, have left Ford Motor with somewhat more than about $25 million in cash, a
position not grossly different from its level in the prior three years. But Ford Motor was
nearly twice the size in 1916 (as measured by revenues), which plausibly would have
demanded a near-doubling of its cash, not a halving.

To see this more precisely, examine the 1916 numbers in Table
1. Ford Motor’s cash position was at $52.55 million in 1916, well above
its 1913 to 1915 average of $27 million. The court-ordered dividend of
roughly $25 million would not have left the company with grossly less
cash than its historical average. (The average was about $27 million,
and if the ordered dividend had been paid in 1916, Ford Motor would
have had about $25 million in cash.) But Ford Motor was twice the size
in 1916 that it had been, as the $206.9 revenue number (about twice
that of its 1913 to 1915 $110 average) indicates. A company twice the
size could plausibly need twice the cash, which the court would not let
Ford Motor retain (if its order had been effectuated in real time).
To see the same issue otherwise, if the ordered dividend had
been paid in 1916, Ford Motor’s cash level would have been about $25
million, but as a proportion of revenue that year, its cash would only
have been about ten percent, when its cash as a percentage of revenue
had been at thirty-four percent in 1915. Ford Motor’s breakneck
expansion can also be perceived via the physical increase in production.
Since Ford Motor was lowering unit prices sharply, its physical
production was growing even more rapidly than its revenues: In 1911–
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1912, just before the assembly line was implemented, Ford Motor sold
78,000 cars. Five years later, in 1916–1917, just after the dividend was
cut and litigation started, Ford Motor sold 730,000, a nearly ten-fold
increase, with eight times as many employees. 54
The Michigan Supreme Court cut back on the lower court’s
operational order, which had enjoined Ford’s River Rouge expansion
and forced cash out, as we’ve seen. While the lower court’s order was
the more intrusive—because it would have affected both operations and
finance—it was more coherent than the appellate court’s splitting of the
baby (which affirmed the financial order and reversed the operational
one). That’s because the lower court’s ordered operational cutback
would have meant that Ford Motor would not need as much cash for
building and wages. The appellate order is less coherent because it let
Ford Motor expand as it wished, but stymied Ford Motor’s preferred
financing—retained earnings—for the expansion.
Justifying expansion with public purpose. So, Ford Motor was
skipping a large dividend not simply because it was hoarding cash (and
seeking to squeeze out the Dodges) but because it was expanding and
needed to keep labor onboard. If Henry Ford’s only goal was to squeeze
out the Dodges, he could have tried harder to win the lawsuit, as the
Michigan court’s Dodge v. Ford decision hurt his ability to pressure the
Dodge brothers to sell out. Ford lost the litigation, and the court ordered
that Ford Motor pay dividends to the Dodges and the other
shareholders. Having won the litigation, the Dodge brothers
presumably could have returned to the Michigan courts to seek further
dividend payment orders if Ford’s dividend stinginess persisted and if
the Dodges did not strike a deal with Ford to sell out.
That is, if Ford’s main goal was to squeeze out the Dodge
brothers, then his litigation strategy was bizarre. He refused to take
what today would be the easy path—pleading business judgment as
supporting the expansion in pursuit of shareholder profit 55—and
instead pushed forward his charitable explanation of sharing profits
with his workers and providing services to the public:
54. ALLAN L. BENSON, THE NEW HENRY FORD 140–41, 169–70 (1923). Once the Dodges were
gone, Ford raised the annual dividend from about $1,200,000 to about $9 million, still less than
half the size of the original court-ordered dividend. Id. at 67, 70.
55. “Mr. Ford declined the [court’s] invitation to offer a business justification for his action.”
CHOPER, COFFEE & GILSON, supra note 4, at 210 n.60; cf. Macey, supra note 39, at 180. Modern
CEOs thus could overemphasize the pro-profit reasons for their public-regarding actions—if they
did in fact prefer charity to profit. I emphasize the opposite for Henry Ford: he had many profit
bases for paying the $5/day wage, for investing in the River Rouge mega-factory, and for adopting
the high-volume/low-price strategy. But for business reasons he overemphasized—dissembled?—
the public-regarding justifications and downplayed the profit-based propellants.
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The record, and especially the testimony of Mr. Ford, convinces that [his] attitude towards
shareholders [is that he had] dispensed and distributed to them large gains and that they
should be content to take what he chooses to give. . . . [H]e thinks the Ford Motor
Company has made too much money, has had too large profits, and that, although large
profits might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, by reducing the price of
the output of the company, ought to be undertaken. . . . [These] philanthropic and
altruistic [sentiments] had large influence in determining the policy to be pursued by the
Ford Motor Company. . . . 56

If Ford wanted only to squeeze out the Dodge brothers at a price
favorable to Ford, it would have been easier to bring forward the
business judgment explanation. While the business judgment rule
probably had not sunk into the corporate fabric back then as deeply as
it has today, the Michigan Supreme Court judges were sympathetic to
a business judgment justification, 57 but Ford would not give it to them.
The source of the squeeze-out pressures on the Dodges. In the end,
the shareholder primacy aspect of the decision in Dodge v. Ford was not
the vise with which Ford squeezed out the Dodge brothers. The Dodge
brothers won, and the company had to pay the court-ordered dividend.
Ford applied the most powerful squeeze-out pressure he had, but did so
outside of the litigation channel. Annoyed that he lost the case and that,
in his view, neither the courts nor the shareholders would let him run
his company as he wished, Ford threatened to quit running Ford Motor
Company. He resigned from the relevant positions. 58 Fear that Henry
Ford, the gifted manager and herald of the assembly line, would
disappear from Ford Motor Company (and possibly start up a wholly

56. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683–84 (Mich. 1919). The judicial decision has
Ford as the active party, not labor. Another way to see the background setting is that labor was
making demands (under the shadow of potential unionization or the potential for poor
productivity) and Ford was acceding, while giving his action a public-regarding patina.
57. Id. at 684–85:
We are not, however, persuaded that we should interfere with the proposed expansion
of the business of the Ford Motor Company. . . . The judges are not business experts. It
is recognized that plans must often be made for a long future, for expected competition,
for a continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture. The experience of the
Ford Motor Company is evidence of capable management of its [operational] affairs.
As I indicate in the text, the judges said they were not business experts but then became financial
experts, ordering the dividend.
A modern court could scrutinize the entire fairness of a dividend that, even though facially
affecting all shareholders proportionately, possibly affected shareholders differently if some had
strong cash needs (i.e., the Dodge brothers, if they needed the cash to compete with Ford). If Ford
Motor’s dividend policy was designed to support Ford Motor’s operating policies (the wage rate and
River Rouge), then a modern court would ask whether the operating policy, if it survived an entire
fairness review (as it did in Dodge v. Ford, although without the entire fairness vocabulary), would
also justify the dividend policy—as keeping cash needed for operations handy—as well.
58. HODAK, supra note 44, at 22–23; CURCIO, supra note 9, at 105–06.
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owned rival automaker) seems to have been the central squeeze-out
pressure on the Dodge brothers. 59
Worse yet for the pure squeeze-out explanation for cutting the
dividend, if Ford had been planning to squeeze out the minority
stockholders all along, he planned for it poorly. By the time of the
buyout in 1920, the money he paid to the $5/day employees and for
starting the River Rouge build-out had left Ford Motor Company with
a woefully low cash balance—a balance so low that he lacked the cash
to buy out the minority stockholders. Ford Motor had to borrow big from
bankers far from Detroit, 60 a borrowing transaction that Ford had
sought to avoid. 61 The resulting balance sheet instability almost
knocked Ford Motor Company over during the unexpected recession of
1920 and 1921. Only through financial wizardry—essentially a forced
borrowing from the company’s dealers—was Ford Motor able to
stabilize itself and move forward.
The pure squeeze-out explanation is thus inconsistent with too
much of the transactional background to be Ford’s primary motivation
in the run-up to Dodge v. Ford. Without understanding Ford’s $5/day
wage rate, without highlighting his splitting of Ford Motor’s monopoly
profit with the company’s employees, and without accounting for his
pursuit of full vertical integration by spending cash to build out the
River Rouge facility to further that monopoly, our conventional
understanding of Dodge v. Ford and its transactional foundations is
somewhere between incomplete and incorrect. 62

59. And perhaps had Ford persisted with the parallel company, he would have set up the
Michigan courts for a different classic corporate decision, but this time on whether the mass
production assembly line idea belonged to Ford Motor Company or to Henry Ford and whether his
planned new car company would have been taking corporate opportunities that properly belonged
to Ford Motor Company.
60. SELTZER, supra note 15, at 111. Ford paid back the loan within a year. That is, he lacked
the cash for the buyout but earned it subsequently. I do not want to push the textual point in this
paragraph too hard, however. Being able to “plead poverty”—or at least a lack of cash—is a good
negotiating tactic to justify a low payment, after all.
61. Ford Motor’s stock buyback was indirect. Henry Ford formed a Delaware shell company,
which borrowed to buy the Dodges’ and other minority stockholders’ stock. The Delaware company
then merged with both the Michigan operating company and the company that held the Ford
family’s stock in the Michigan company. SELTZER, supra note 15, at 110–13. The indirect effect
though was to use up company cash for the buyback.
The dividend and the buyback can be seen as a continuous M-M transaction. See supra note
49. In principle, the dividend should have lowered the value the Michigan company, but put into
its shareholders’ hands cash equivalent to the lowered value.
62. Other theoretical aspects of Dodge v. Ford need further exploration. The Dodge brothers
had been Ford Motors’ parts suppliers. As Ford sought vertical integration, their contribution
declined, and it was more important to the organization that labor be loyal and productive—and
be paid more. In effect, the composition of the Ford team was changing, with outside parts
suppliers becoming less important and inside labor more important.
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IV. WHY DODGE V. FORD RESONATES TODAY
Henry Ford did not keep his monopoly. Overextended financially
by (1) the $5/day wage, (2) the River Rouge expenses, (3) the buyback of
the Dodges and other minority stockholders, and (4) the court-ordered
dividend, Ford Motor and Henry Ford were poorly positioned to weather
the sharp recession of 1920–1921. Perhaps worse, Ford’s marketing
vision was of a single affordably priced car model for a broad segment
of car buyers, made in a single vertically integrated facility along the
River Rouge by well-paid, well-motivated, and non-unionized assemblyline workers.
That strategy and vision proved inapt and unsustainable.
The twenties. General Motors, a weak competitor in the 1910s,
when it was just getting its manufacturing bearings, had a different
marketing vision than Ford had in the 1920s. It differentiated its
models, their status, and the auto finishes to suit different economic
levels, selling premium cars to the well-to-do and ordinary cars to the
less well-off. 63

Tax developments in the 1910s are relevant. The Revenue Act of 1918 taxed dividends to the
wealthy at a seventy-seven percent rate. That alone could explain Ford Motor’s cutback in
dividends by 1919, when Dodge v. Ford was decided. But alone it cannot explain what happened
and why: first, the key transactions began in 1913, when Ford introduced the $5/day wage and
began planning the River Rouge facility, whose construction broke ground in 1917. The 1913 tax
rate was only a few percent.
Second, Ford Motor dropped its dividend payout in 1916, well before the tax rate rose so high.
Ford Motor’s last special dividend payment (the company then generally paid large special, and
minor regular, dividends) was on October 13, 1915, when the highest tax rate on dividends was
seven percent; the Dodge brothers sued on November 2, 1916, when the highest dividend tax rate
was thirty-five percent. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. In late 1917, the War Revenue
Act raised the highest dividend rate to seventy-seven percent, and in 1919 the rate was pushed
higher. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057
(1919). The tax law’s relevance then would just be that it impeded a rise in the payout rate. The
most plausible anticipation date for the jump in the tax rate was well after the underlying 1913
and 1914 transactional events, in April 1917, when war was declared and the possibility of a tax
rate increase publicly discussed. For the discussion of a war tax, see John W. Hillje, New York
Progressives and the War Revenue Act of 1917, 53 N.Y. HIST. 437 (1972).
Third, the high tax rate on dividends can explain why Ford Motor retained its earnings, but
cannot explain what it did with the retained cash—spending it on River Rouge and the $5/day. For
the 1910s tax developments, see Steven Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income
Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 917–27 (2006). The transaction dates for Ford Motor are as reported in
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 668; see also Linda Kawaguchi, Introduction to Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co.: Primary Source and Commentary Material, 17 CHAPMAN L. REV. 493 (2014).
63. Steve Blank, Apple’s Marketing Playbook Was Written in the 1920s, ATLANTIC (Oct. 26,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/10/apples-marketing-playbook-waswritten-in-the-1920s/247417 [https://perma.cc/9589-ZS2Q] (in the 1920s, “[w]ith the rallying cry ‘a
car for every purse and purpose,’ GM positioned its car divisions . . . so they would cover five price
segments — from low-price to luxury . . . [and] targeted each of its brands . . . to a distinct economic
segment of the population”).
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Not burdened by Ford Motor’s financial commitments, General
Motors weathered the 1920–1921 recession better than did Ford Motor
and, by the end of the twenties, replaced Ford as the country’s major
auto manufacturer. The auto market began to take its modern
oligopolistic shape. By the 1940s, Ford Motor was unionized and
faced one of the country’s most aggressive unions, the United
Automotive Workers. 64
Post–World War II and the fifties. The concept of monopoly
providing the umbrella to share profits with employees persisted. After
World War II, GM was de facto the automaker with significant market
power that made it a near monopoly. The 1950s Justice Department
was said to want General Motors, which had about half of the U.S.
market, broken up. 65
During this era, General Motors’ labor strategy paralleled Ford’s
in the 1910s. GM’s senior executives understood that with monopoly
power, the critical issue for GM after World War II was to produce cars.
Cost structure was important but secondary. So, GM was more willing
than it otherwise would have been to settle labor disputes and strikes
in ways favorable to labor. GM shared its monopoly profit with labor so
as to assure that the company could sell cars. Consumers paid for GM’s
generosity to its labor stakeholders. (Or, looking to labor as the active
actor, consumers paid for the fact that GM could not produce cars
without a labor agreement and labor would not agree unless its pay and
working conditions were better than GM would otherwise have
provided. GM’s monopoly profits were split with labor.)
This dynamic scaled up from a single (although large) firm and
became an economy-wide phenomenon in the 1950s. It was American
manufacturing’s heyday, with other industries also characterized by
oligopolistic structures like the “Big Three” or “Big Four” in auto
manufacturing, steel, and other industries. In that kind of economy,
large firms could act similarly to Ford in the 1910s by sharing profits
with employees because, with competition weak in their industry, the
firm that paid well would not be run out of business.
64. See, e.g., The United Automobile Workers (UAW) and Ford Motor Company: Working
Together, FORD, http://ophelia.sdsu.edu:8080/ford/03-15-2014/our-company/heritage/companymilestones-news-detail/685-uaw.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2R94-5GZZ];
Ford Signs First Contract with UAW on June 20, 1941, UNITED AUTO WORKERS,
https://uaw.org/ford-signs-first-contract-uaw-june-20-1941/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/TW8C-8LF2].
65. Anti-Trust Study of Auto Industry Is Started by U.S.—[Attorney-General] Brownell Tells
Economic Club Explanation Is Sought for Growing Concentration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1954, at 1;
Harlan Fisk, The Senate Report on General Motors, NEW LEADER, Nov. 24, 1958, at 5 (Senate
committee recommends “that the Justice Department investigate . . . whether to try to break up
the GM empire”); ALEX TAYLOR III, SIXTY TO ZERO 15–16 (2010). At the time, GM had half of the
U.S. auto market. TAYLOR, supra, at 15.
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In the antitrust world, the 1950s American economy was
thought to be beset by oligopolistic weak competition 66 and limited
international competition in manufacturing. Antitrust academics
sought to build out better practical ways to deal with oligopolistic
pricing, 67 which was seen as the signature antitrust problem of the
postwar decades. 68 In the corporate world, the statesman-like
corporation—i.e., one that took care of its workers—was the concept
that prevailed. Oligopolistic profits paid for that statesmanship.
In academic work, the quintessential 1950s view of the large
corporation came in The Corporation in Modern Society, a volume
edited by Harvard economist Edward Mason, 69 with contributions from
the antitrust and corporate academic leaders of the time. “The
proposition that a group of giant business corporations . . . embodies a
significant and troublesome concentration of power,” wrote Carl
Kaysen, one of the era’s antitrust luminaries, “is the cliché which serves
this [1950s] volume as a foundation stone.” 70 Mason put his finger on
the problem: The large American corporation was undoubtedly
financially successful, but were workers, suppliers, and customers
being treated well and getting their fair share? he asked. 71 Post–World
War II, foreign competition was weak. Domestic manufacturing was
concentrated and more core to the American economy then than it is
today. And oligopolistic industry structure was pervasive. 72
Unpack Mason’s and Kaysen’s thinking. The large firm—the Big
Threes and the Big Fours in autos, steel, and elsewhere—had to pay
their employees enough to be productive and effective. Kaysen and
Mason must then have been thinking that a fair society should benefit
those workers and other stakeholders more and that concentrated
66. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); Carl Kaysen, The
Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 85, 89–
90, (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959) (classifying the manufacturing, transportation, and finance
sectors as oligopolistic, and public utilities and telephone communications as often monopolistic).
67. See Kaysen, supra note 66, at 98; Louis B. Schwartz, Administered Prices, Oligopoly and
the Sherman Act, 12 SECTION ANTITRUST L. 17 (1958); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72
J. POL. ECON. 44, 58 (1964).
68. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 110–11 (1959) (the “inability to cope with market power created by jointly acting
oligopolists” is “[t]he principal defect of present antitrust law”).
69. THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 66; see also Mark J. Roe, From
Antitrust to Corporate Governance? The Corporation and the Law: 1959–1994, in THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION TODAY 102, 102–27 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996).
70. Kaysen, supra note 66, at 85.
71. Edward S. Mason, Introduction to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 66,
at 11.
72. Id. at 20; Kaysen, supra note 66, at 85; see also Marshall Hall & Leonard Weiss, Firm
Size and Profitability, 49 REV. ECON. & STAT. 319 (1967); William G. Shepherd, The Elements of
Market Structure, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 25 (1972).
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industry (1) was powerful and (2) had the wherewithal—oligopolistic
profit—to distribute the bounty more widely. This was in large measure
the Ford Motor setting that led to Dodge v. Ford.
When competitive forces only weakly constrained the big firms,
corporations could better care for stakeholders (or at least not damage
them) than when competitive forces tightly constrained firms from
considering stakeholders unless doing so was profitable (or at least not
costly). With Europe and Japan in the 1950s still recovering from their
World War II destruction, international competitors did not constrain
the domestic oligopolistic competitors.
The sixties and seventies. In the 1960s, competition increased.
The domestic economy itself became more competitive and
international manufacturers, primarily from western Europe and east
Asia, vigorously competed with American manufacturing. From the
1950s to the 1970s, the HHI index—a common measure of industrial
concentration—declined sharply, by one-half or more for eight major
industries. 73 By the end of the 1970s, Chrysler Corporation, one of the
“Big Three” automakers, which were facing relentless and effective
German and Japanese auto competition, needed an unprecedented
billion-dollar government bailout to survive. It is no coincidence, in my
view, that Milton Friedman wrote his famous essay on the social
responsibility of American business to produce profits for shareholders
in 1970, 74 when competition was more substantial, or perceived to be
more substantial, than it had been in prior decades.
Today. The Dodge v. Ford background anticipates modern
corporate issues. Purpose pressure, corporate social responsibility, and
attention to environmental, social, and governance concerns have
grown greatly in the past decade. Purpose pressure is so substantial
that the Business Roundtable—the elite organization of CEOs of the
country’s two hundred largest corporations—demoted shareholder
value from their primary stated goal to fifth on a list topped by
stakeholders and consumers. 75
One strain of academic and popular thinking has it that
competition has declined in the United States in the past two or three
decades. Some academic analysts blame lax antitrust enforcement,
73. RAYMOND VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS 81 (1977). To be sure here, modern
academic thinking has it that the HHI level is not a strong indicator of competition vs. monopoly.
74. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 17.
75. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy
That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), www.businessroundtable.org/
business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-topromote-an-economy-that-servesall-americans [https://perma.cc/PW4R-XXRE].
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while others look to concentration in stock ownership that weakens
competition. Others analyze the situation as resulting from intense
competition in markets with steep economies of scale or with network
externalities, each of which impel larger firms with significant market
share, and those firms enjoy monopoly rents until displaced by a new
technology or a new competitor that is able to win and take (most of)
the market away. Think of Blockbuster VCR rentals being displaced by
Netflix-mailed DVDs. Whatever the source of the new market power,
the point is that there are substantial concerns (which are, yes,
disputed) that competition has declined or that economic rents are up
because of more and larger skill, foresight, and industry monopolies
(like Ford achieved with the assembly line). Whether due to competitive
decline or perspicacity, today more firms are positioned like Ford Motor
Company in the 1910s—with high rents and supracompetitive profits.
Those extra profits give firms more leeway to accommodate stakeholder
and purpose pressures than if those firms competed in hypercompetitive product markets where a small deviation from profit
maximization would put the firm’s existence at risk. I analyze the
contemporary impact elsewhere. 76
For American industry today, it might just be Dodge v. Ford all
over again.
*
*
*
True, this better analysis of the background business situation
here need not completely change the decision’s legal implications.
Dodge v. Ford’s meaning comes from what the courts did with the facts
as they understood them. At the simplest level, the Michigan court
thought Ford Motor had too much cash, without a convincing purpose
for that cash, and ordered a dividend. But a better understanding of
what happened can lead other courts, policymakers, classrooms, and
analysts to see the situation more accurately and, hence, better
understand what was at stake socially and economically. And for bigpicture social scientists, the court decision is just one part of a
transactional sequence and its industrial and labor structure.
Here’s what I mean. What the court saw as Ford Motor’s
charitable impulse was really Ford and labor dividing up a monopoly
profit, with Ford seeking to bring labor onboard (by sidelining the
unions and keeping labor loyal enough for the assembly line and River
Rouge to succeed). This conceptualization leads to two analytic strands
76. Roe, supra note 2, at 236. For the possibility that this rent-splitting dynamic was
particularly important in post–World War II Western Europe, see Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their
Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2001); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 125–49 (2003).
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of the monopoly profit’s division. In one, the rent is sustained only
because it is shared. In a second, the portion of the rent paid to workers
exceeded what needed sharing and Ford had discretion on how to
allocate it. I have put forward here the case for the first channel being
real and substantial, with the second not being the only one, and maybe
not even the central one for Ford Motor circa 1913–1919. The court was
conceptualizing the labor share as solely, or primarily, being Ford’s
to bestow.
While I am confident that this better explains the underlying
transactions that led to the litigation, we should be wary that Henry
Ford could have used the modern business judgment rule well in the
litigation. Although a modern corporate court would quite likely have
left the monopoly issues to the antitrust authorities, or readily viewed
Ford’s assembly as bestowing a “skill, foresight, and industry”
monopoly, monopolization concepts back then were less clear in
antitrust terms, and corporate law mixed readily with antitrust
considerations. For example, in Standard Oil of Ohio, the 1880s
foundational antitrust lawsuit, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered
Standard Oil of Ohio to drop out of the Standard Oil Trust. Why?
Because joining it to constrict trade was ultra vires, as a matter of state
corporate law—not within the power of the Ohio corporation. 77
Similarly, New Jersey went through a two-decade cycle of permissive
corporate law (that facilitated the trusts) at the end of the 1880s, until
the reformer Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and 1913, on the eve of his
presidency, restricted corporate law in an effort to curb monopoly
power. It was plausible for Ford, or his counsel, to think that an
aggressive business judgment strategy—“I sought a monopoly and I had
to buy off labor”—would have been unwise. The Dodge brothers had
sued to bar Ford Motor from building River Rouge because it would
cement the Ford monopoly, and they won in the lower court; while the
appellate court rejected the monopoly claim in the end, Ford had reason
not to argue that Ford Motor had a monopoly, albeit a protectable,
“skill, foresight, and industry” one.
And Ford had even less public branding reason to do so: his
popularly priced cars were selling to a market of average earners who
77. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 291 (Ohio 1892). On the mixing
of corporate and antitrust considerations in corporate law at the end of the nineteenth and
beginning of the twentieth centuries, from Ohio’s corporate law attack on the Standard Oil Trust
as ultra vires the Ohio firm’s corporate power to Woodrow Wilson’s repeal of the New Jersey
“mother of trusts” corporate laws, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV.
588, 607–09 (2003).
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were not, Ford could have judged, anti-union or anti-labor. Announcing
his effort to manipulate labor and to extend the monopoly was unlikely
to increase Ford’s existing popularity with the average Americans who
made up his market. Better, both for marketing and maybe even
litigation purposes, to announce a pro-worker, pro-consumer policy. A
better strategy in 1919, yes, but still one that lost in the Michigan
Supreme Court.
*
*
*
I close this Part out with two thoughts—one that these analyses
of a squeeze-out and a splitting of the monopoly rectangle could be
overthinking the business transaction and the other again on how this
reinterpretation of Dodge v. Ford resonates today.
Ford was by the time of the litigation very rich. He could readily
have preferred adulation to another dollar. Thinking of Ford’s
testimony as branding makes business sense but it could also have been
a successful, wealthy executive looking for respect. Of all the possible
defenses, the one he chose was the one most likely to lead to a heroic
Henry Ford, a titan of Detroit, being seen as bestowing value on his
loyal workers and equipping average Americans with the revolutionary,
inexpensive basic transportation of the twentieth century. And, for a
man who was about to run for the United States Senate in 1918, a prolabor, pro-consumer explanation was more likely to resonate with
Michigan voters than calculated anti-union, efficiency-wage thinking.
The splitting-the-rectangle explanation for the Dodge v. Ford
transactions resonates with today’s corporate social responsibility
movement. Rising rents in America’s largest firms have given their
executives and boards more discretion on how to allocate those rents. 78
At the same time, powerful and effective shareholder activism pushes
that those rents go primarily or solely to shareholders. 79 Proshareholder forces now have two channels for pushing for shareholder
profit—a longstanding one that, as idealized, has long pushed
executives and boards to be operationally efficient, which thereby
usually increases the size of the economic pie, and a newer one of getting
those newer rents primarily allocated to shareholders, which in itself
usually affects not the pie’s size but how it is divided. 80
78. Roe, supra note 2, at 240–44, 250–56.
79. Id. at 263–65; cf. Mark R. Desjardine, Emilio Marti & Rodolphe Durand, Why Activist
Hedge Funds Target Socially Responsible Firms: The Reaction Costs of Signaling Corporate Social
Responsibility, 64 ACAD. MGMT. J. 851 (2020).
80. Roe, supra note 2, at 263–65.
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CONCLUSION
To understand why Henry Ford ran his car company in a way
that led to the litigation resulting in the 1919 Dodge v. Ford Michigan
Supreme Court decision, one must understand how Ford’s monopoly
both gave Ford cash-spending capacity and created a valuable but
vulnerable market position that needed protection—by building bigger
and keeping labor loyal. The Dodge brothers sued Ford because Ford
Motor stopped paying high dividends and because Ford Motor was
building out a huge, vertically integrated car factory along the River
Rouge. The standard squeeze-out explanation for the dividend
stoppage—that Ford could then buy the Dodge brothers out at a low
price—cannot account for much of the transactional structure in the
run-up to the litigation, as Ford Motor’s spending that denied it the cash
for continuing high dividend payouts was much larger than the amount
he paid when ultimately buying out the Dodge brothers.
Instead, or at least in addition, two channels were in play. Ford
was experiencing an early twentieth-century form of pressure to pursue
a better corporate purpose in a company with significant rents. This
early twentieth-century version of corporate purpose pressure had him
paying his workers far above the market rate for labor and had his
company building and selling a mass-manufactured car for the popular
consumer masses. The monopoly could neither have been built nor
maintained without labor’s cooperation. Regardless of whether Ford
was bestowing the $5/day wage or labor was taking it from him, the
monopoly had a joint quality to it. Underlying the Dodge v. Ford
decision was Ford Motor’s monopoly and the splitting of the resultant
monopoly profits between the company and the auto workers. A
powerful shareholder split the rents with latently powerful labor;
analogues to such stakeholder pressure in firms with high rents can be
discerned today. The monopoly gave Ford the wherewithal to share
profits with stakeholders, the purpose pressure gave him a reason to do
so, and accommodating the purpose pressure facilitated his capacity to
retain the monopoly—for a while.

